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Nixon Doctrine of Balance of Power Departed From Wilson Idealism

Nixon: “Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its most able people to live in angry isolation.”  Nixon wrote this in Foreign Affairs in 1967.

 

Nixon said after returning from China in 1972 “We must cultivate China; otherwise we will be confronted with the most formidable enemy that has ever existed in the history of the world.”

 

In 1972, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s National Security Advisor, took the courageous and pragmatic step of visiting China, ultimately leading to the restoration of diplomatic relations between these two erstwhile enemies. This bold initiative dramatically altered the balance of power in the Cold War. That is, America and China over the ensuing years established significant diplomatic and commercial relationships, thereby cementing a mutual need for coexistence and setting aside their divergent positions on economic systems, and forms of government. Nixon and Kissinger might have formed the ablest foreign policy team in American history. Today, China is our fourth largest trading partner. Our financial and commercial linkages anchor U.S.-China relations. 

 

Richard Nixon entered office in the midst of one of the greatest foreign policy crises in American history. The Cold War was at its height, hundreds of thousands of American troops were in Vietnam, and the views of society were split down the middle. Nixon felt along with Henry Kissinger that it was imperative to change America’s foreign policy. They felt that to support our interests in the long run, it was necessary to have a balance of power. They were willing to use different political philosophies based on geography and self-interest. If the major powers pursued their self-interest rationally and predictably, equilibrium would emerge from the conflicting interest. Under Nixon’s new policy partnership, strength, and the willingness to negotiate were the three pillars essential to keeping the peace. This policy would stop trying to eliminate communism and win the Cold War, but rather replace it through new initiatives directed toward finding areas of cooperation. In essence, Kissinger and Nixon recognized the reality of the world and the limits to our power. They rejected the Kennedy idealism “pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any fore to assure the survival and success of liberty.” Kissinger and Nixon realized that the United States needed to be practical in order not to over extend our military. A foreign policy based on our self-interest created an equilibrium and ultimately peace. That is, a healthy United States, Europe, Japan, Russia, and China each balancing each other was safer than a world where these countries competed against one another. 

 

My father, Dr. Joseph Werlin, who died in 1964, was a political realist who for practical reasons felt that our non-recognition of China was flawed. While he did not forecast that China could become one of our major trading partners, he did not think that it was in American self-interest to treat China as a pariah state. He felt that ultimately a majority of countries would oppose the American policy that Taiwan represented China in the Security Council of the United Nations.  By  1972, we were increasingly isolated in this position and could expect a rebuff in the United Nations. That is, more and more countries wanted to recognize the political reality that the communists represented Mainland China in the Security Council. Proponents for a change in American policy noted that to ignore a billion people undermined the purpose of the United Nations. My father noted that even our ally England had recognized Red China in the early 1950’s. 

 

“The loss of China” in 1949 to the communists rankled many Americans, and led to a purge of state department personnel who appeared to be “soft” on communism. In 1954, hardliners forced the resignation of several of our most experienced Far Eastern experts. (Robert McNamara felt that the dismissal of experienced Far Eastern experts directly led to judgmental foreign policy errors in Vietnam).  A conspiracy theory emerged regarding the failure of the pro-western Chiang Kai –shek. Only belatedly did Americans learn of the ineptitude of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Government (Chiang’s critics derisively nicknamed him “Cash My Check”). That is, the large-scale corruption of the Nationalist government made it vulnerable to the broad scale changes advocated by the Communists.  Mao Zedong, the leader of the Communist Revolution, recognized that gaining the support of the Chinese peasant farmers, approximately 80% of the population, was the essential building bloc for developing a strong nationalistic communist state. Mao shrewdly recognized that Chiang Kai-shek’s support for a feudal land system made the peasants responsive to an agrarian reform party, 

 

In the late 1960s, the prevailing political wisdom in the United states generally agreed with Napoleon’s remark, “let China sleep;” when she awoke the world would regret it. Mao was either eulogized for unifying China or demonized for his methods. Many people were justifiably horrified by the excesses of the Cultural Revolution that led to the death of millions of people. Nixon and Kissinger were willing to overlook Chinese massive civil rights violations in order to bring China into the brotherhood of nations. 

 

Nixon and Kissinger have justifiably been recognized for their astute knowledge of foreign affairs. Establishing normal relations with China was an important first step in a more tolerant attitude toward other communist bloc countries. Today, the focus of stress is global terrorism not competing forms of government or economic systems.