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Roosevelt's Second Act: The Election of 1940 and the Politics of War by Richard Moe

Byline: 

Because this book is so focused on a single, but pivotal year, I am hesitant to recommend it. That is, one has to be a committed World War II Buff to enjoy it.

Richard Moe, the former president of the National Trust for Historical Preservation provided an intensive and nuanced interpretation of 1940, which highlighted Roosevelt’s decision to run for a third term, urge rearmament, and provide aid to Great Britain. Roosevelt was a complex individual, who was arrogant, manipulative, charismatic, and shrewd. That said, his decision to serve a third term might have made the difference in the allies defeating fascism. We need to remember that both Congress and the public had strong isolationist views that required artful cultivation. Specifically, America had initially passed the Neutrality Act in 1935 that effectively prevented helping the Democracies against Hitler.

In addressing the issue of serving a third term, Roosevelt had to weigh several factors. First of all, he was anxious to rebuild the Roosevelt finances, which had been depleted from his long rehabilitation from polio, his four years as governor of New York, and his eight years as president. Secondly, he felt that the two leading candidates on the democratic side--VP John Nance Garner and James Farley-- both by their personal philosophies and inexperience-- were dissatisfactory successors given the worldwide state of war. Thirdly, Roosevelt felt that the isolationist, anti-New Deal sentiment of Republican congressional leaders, would cripple Wendell Wilkie, if he became president. The one person who Roosevelt felt was capable of succeeding him, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, was reluctant to run for the presidency. 

Roosevelt had several important allies in securing his third term and making his case for helping Great Britain.  His speechwriter, Sam Rosenman; his Secretary of Commerce Harry Hopkins and Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, and newspaper publisher William Allen White.

The author highlighted Roosevelt’s use of deception to penalize would-be candidates on the Democratic Party side from running.  In essence, because Roosevelt never renounced his willingness to serve a third term, he effectively barred others from running.  James Farley, who managed Roosevelt’s campaigns in 1932 and 1936, bitterly resented Roosevelt’s aloofness. Instead of Roosevelt cultivating Farley, he kept the later at a distance.

Among the nation’s many isolationists were pacifists, socialists, German sympathizers, communists, and even New Dealers focused on domestic economic problems. Such polarizing figures as Charles Lindbergh, who described the German air power he had witnessed on several visits to that country in periodic radio addresses and speeches before the isolationist group America First, garnered favorable public opinion. Though Americans would not all have supported the appeasement Lindbergh urged, many agreed that their country should stay out of “Europe’s War.” Moe’s attention to the multifaceted isolationism of everyday Americans is important to his argument. FDR’s overwhelming belief that democracy’s preservation was tied to the United States’ willingness to aid those opposing fascism and the election of a president strong enough to do this required overcoming widespread isolationism.

FDR showed courage and intelligence in the following areas: (1) He encouraged America to rearm (2) he pushed successfully for a peacetime draft and (3) he overrode the advice of his generals and admirals to allocate our scarce military resources to Great Britain. The reluctance of our military was motivated by (1) our lack of armaments and (2) fear that Great Britain would collapse and these armaments would fall into the hands of the victorious Germans.

Events in Europe provided the push needed to get past this hurdle. Adolf Hitler made progressively clearer steps toward continental domination and posed a pressing threat to Great Britain, his last major democratic foe in the region after Germany installed a puppet regime in Vichy France. This situation forced Americans to realize the seriousness of the war. Even the more isolationist Republican Party selected a candidate for the general election who supported internationalism. Moe’s treatment of Willkie as an individual and politician is thorough and insightful. Though Willkie made a mistake in delaying his campaign after the Republican convention, thereby allowing Roosevelt to make strides with voters by presenting himself as an assertive commander in chief, his presence in the election was crucial. Willkie’s internationalism assured that he would pursue similar tactics to Roosevelt’s and depoliticized the foreign policy decisions the president was making as the election drew nearer. Policies to aid the allies, such as “cash-and-carry” and the Lend-Lease Act, became the country’s only recourse.

Moe paid homage to the voters of 1940 for their courage in supporting democracy through the unconventional reelection of a third-term president. As Americans approach momentous electoral decisions themselves, they would do well to consider their deepest values once more.

Let me conclude by citing two interesting episodes. First of all, how did the stampede for Roosevelt take place at the convention, which was held in Chicago? Ed Flynn, the party boss of Chicago, stacked the convention hall with pro-Roosevelt partisans. When the keyword was spoken, a planted operative (the head of sanitation in Chicago “the voice from the sewers” spoke through a microphone--We want FDR. This went on for 45 minutes). The next day FDR got the nomination overwhelmingly but not unanimously. That is, James Farley and John Garner got a few votes.

Secondly, Roosevelt had to deal with his isolationist, appeasement oriented, defeatist Ambassador to the Court of St. James--Joseph Kennedy. FDR was afraid of Kennedy because the later was an important Catholic lay leader. A Kennedy defection to the Republicans could have led to a Wilkie victory. Roosevelt assuaged Kennedy until he was reelected and then threw him under the bus.

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