Byline: 

By John Lukacs

I am already starting work for my upcoming class on Modern American History which will begin in January 2016.  Our first few lectures will be on World War II—the war that saved civilization.

John Lukacs told the story of a duel between Adolph Hitler and Winston Churchill.  At first one feels that the concept of a duel might appear over stated-- taking away from those broader historical categories of economic, diplomatic, military and political factors in World War II. But "The Duel" manages to be convincing in its argument that the particular decisions and personalities of Churchill and Hitler determined the future of our world. Mr. Lukacs persuades the reader that if Churchill had not been Prime Minister, the British leadership might have given in to the temptations of a peace treaty.

In the course of the 80 day Duel the role of the protagonists changes markedly. At the beginning, Winston Churchill’s position as Prime Minister appears untenable. Much of his support comes from the Labor Party, rather than his own Conservative Party. Specifically, in forming a National Union Party Labor would not serve under either Neville Chamberlain or Lord Halifax, both of whom are favored by a majority of the Conservatives. By the end of the eighty days, Churchill has a firm grip on power, taking on “near dictatorial powers in order to direct Britain’s wartime activities.”

By contrast, Hitler appears to be a legendary military leader whose victories surpass Frederik the Great, Napoleon, and Genghis Kahn. Only in hindsight do we recognize that Hitler’s failed bid to force Great Britain to capitulate encourage him to make another monumental mistake—invading the Soviet Union. While nobody suspected at the end of the duel’s time period, Hitler’s bold policies would destroy Germany and lead to his suicide in 1945, Hitler faced a formidable challenger—Winston Churchill. Over the next few years, Hitler added to his challenges—Joseph Stalin and Franklin Roosevelt.

Mr. Lukacs makes clear the rather uncertain position that Churchill occupied at the beginning of his time as prime minister, not only in terms of the country's imperiled existence but also in the comparatively weak support he received from his fellow politicians, most of whom had mistrusted him for years. Consistent with his commitment to magnanimity, Churchill, although determined to lead and feeling much more assured now that he was in a position to do so, was strikingly generous in his loyalty to his discredited predecessor, Neville Chamberlain. Lukacs argues that during the time period encompassing the Duel, Chamberlain changed from an adversary of Churchill to an admirer of his leadership qualities.

On the military side, Hitler’s attack on the Netherlands, Belgium and France is brilliantly orchestrated, leading to the French capitulation by the middle of June. As early as May 17th, French defeatism is rampant, requiring Churchill initially to waver between providing Britain’s scant resources to its beleaguered ally and retaining sufficient arms to withstand the eventual Battle of Britain.

The rapid fall of Western European democracies, most notably France, seemed to confirm Hitler’s contempt for the flabbiness of democratic ideals. There were quite a few in Britain particularly in the upper Classes and the United States who found attractive the ideas of the "new order" projected by Germany. 

The role of America’s ambassador to Great Britain, Joseph Kennedy, could have had catastrophic results. Kennedy, who hated Churchill and admired the Nazis, prophesized the immanent defeat of Great Britain. He urged no shipment of arms to Great Britain, arguing (1) the United States needed to recognize the success of the Nazis on the European Continent (2) America should focus its enmity toward the Soviet Union and (3) America should retain for its own defenses its incipient armaments.

In late May, the British War cabinet debated for three days whether to accept Lord Halifax’s suggestion that Britain should pursue peace negotiations through Italy with Nazi Germany. Churchill, supported by two Labor Cabinet Members, Clement Atlee and Arthur Greenwood, argued that Britain’s position would be enhanced by (1) fighting to the bitter end and (2) peace negotiations would terminate any prospect of receiving material aid from America. Churchill carried the day, and convinced Halifax that he needed to stay in the government as an act of loyalty.

The role of the United States under Franklin Roosevelt changed markedly over these 80 days. Initially, FDR was constrained by our neutrality clauses. FDR also received conflicting reports about Churchill’s capability. Kennedy and others dismissed Churchill as a drunkard and opportunists. Over the 80 day time period, America abandoned its neutralist policies, even providing Britain with 50 aging destroyers of World War I vintage. The ships were of almost no military value, but fundamentally altered America’s role. Gaining America’s support enhanced Churchill’s position within the Conservative Party and with the British public. Despite facing incalculable odds, the British public became enthusiastic supporters of Churchill’s war of words—believing that their struggle was waged to save civilization—their finest hour.

The incredible nomination of Wendell Willkie who supported Britain over the isolationist Senator Robert Taft and former President Herbert Hoover in June 1940 helped immensely FDR. That is, FDR felt emboldened to take steps to help Britain given the tacit support of his efforts by Willkie. Interestingly enough, the social club Cosmopolitan—located in New York City, provided critical help to Willkie in gaining the nomination. The Anglophile Eastern Establishment Republican Party was a formidable king maker in Republican politics from 1940 until 1964—the nomination of Barry Goldwater.

The miracle of Dunkirk (May 28-June 4, 1940), where close to 350,000 British and French troops safely evacuated back to Britain, added to British morale.

On July 16, Hitler issued a directive, "Preparation for Landing Operation Against England." Three days later, on July 19, when the duel was at its most intense, Hitler delivered a speech of more than two hours that presented a "rational" case for peace -- to prevent death and destruction. Churchill would not reply, not being, as he said to his secretary, John Colville, "on speaking terms" with Hitler.

It became clear that though Britain was alone, Churchill was not prepared to follow the example of France and settle for a Hitlerian peace. Enraged, Hitler then turned to war in the air, first the Battle of Britain in August and then the Blitz in September. Even before that, on July 31, Hitler had decided that he would also turn to the invasion of his ally the Soviet Union, which he fantasized might, at some future date, come to the aid of Britain. 

Although the German invasion of the Soviet Union did not happen until June 21, 1941,  , Mr. Lukacs would have it -- stretching a bit -- that the attack on Russia was conceived less because of Hitler's anti-Communist and anti-Slav obsessions than as a further attempt to isolate Britain. The irony is that the fantasy of a British-Russian alliance was in due course to be realized, although not as Hitler imagined it.

Interestingly enough, Churchill’s authorization of British destruction of the French fleet in late July 1940 was brilliant for several reasons: (1) it convinced many people in the American administration—including Secretary of War, Henry Stimson and Secretary of the Army, George Marshall—that Britain was committed to fighting it out. (2) it eliminated the potential of the formidable French fleet ending up in the hands of the Nazis (3) solidified Churchill’s support in Parliament.

The performance of the British air force during the Battle of Britain was inspiring. Helped by radar, fighting on their home terrain, and daunting courage, Britain convinced Hitler that he could not achieve the dominance of the skies necessary for a successful invasion.

It is salutary to be reminded in this powerful study how close Hitler came to winning in 1940. At the end of that summer, victory for the Allies was a long way in the future. But with the prospect of a negotiated peace abandoned, with Franklin Roosevelt helping out Britain and with Hitler turning his attention to Russia, the pieces were falling into place. At the end of September 1940, Hitler no longer could claim that he vanquished all of his enemies. Indeed, to conquer the European continent, Hitler needed to focus on a different strategy to neutralize British influence.

Mr. Lukacs proved, namely the virtues of conservative values, although radical views are not necessarily discredited by Churchill's triumph. Mr. Lukacs's concluding words are true of the duel he has written about so eloquently: "A great statesman prevailed over a great revolutionary; the writer over the orator; a cosmopolitan over a racist; a democratic aristocrat over a populist demagogue; a traditionalist over a radical; a patriot over a nationalist -- during the Second World War which was a catastrophe for millions of people but whose outcome spared the world an even worse fate.